Déjà Vu All Over Again
Happy Friday.
I recently finished George F. Kennan's memoirs. As many know, in his capacity as a career member of the Foreign Service, Kennan authored two of the most famous documents in modern-day diplomacy: the Long Telegram and the X-Article. He also participated peripherally in the development of the Truman Doctrine (with which he disagreed) and substantively in the development of the Marshall Plan (he chaired the Policy Planning Staff which developed the initiative).
A prolific writer and perspicacious observer, Kennan rarely failed to share his thinking with his superiors. In reading his thoughts on the post-hostilities treatment of Germany after the Second World War, I was struck by how they resonated sixty years later.
Kennan was concerned about the Allies' policy:
Kennan's objections to this view are below (the emphasis is my own). Generally, Kennan feared that the political and cultural destruction of Germany by an occupying foreign power would incite a violent nationalist insurgency. He suggested, in the alternative, an approach by which the ruling elite was forced to recognize the futility of their aggression. Having already been defeated militarily, the "logic of history" and "organic development of German political life" would lead to their ultimate demise in the face of democratic ideals as determined and adopted by Germans' own "national experiences"; not as imposed by a foreign occupier.
Please feel free to substitute “Iraq” for “Germany” at every opportunity.
___________________________________________________________
Memoirs: 1925-1950
by George F. Kennan
[First] there is no thornier or more thankless task in the field of foreign affairs than that of trying to probe into the political records and motives of masses of individuals in a foreign country. It is impossible to avoid injustices, errors, and resentment. It involves the maintenance of a huge, and necessarily unpopular, investigative apparatus. I should place the proposed program for Germany clearly beyond the capacity of our own intelligence agencies. ...
If we attempt to carry out the program indicated, we will not succeed. People will either escape notice entirely; or they will prove their indispensability on technical grounds; or they will disappear and pop up elsewhere under other names; or they will see that records are destroyed ... We will eventually get caught up in a round of denunciation, confusion, and disunity from which none but the Germans would stand to profit.
Second, the project, even if it could be successfully carried out, would not serve the purpose for which it is designed. We would not find any other class of people competent to assume the burdens of those we had eliminated. Whether we like it or not, nine-tenths of what is strong, able, and respected in Germany has been poured into those very categories we have in mind. To remove these categories would mean to saddle some alternative regime – presumably composed of our occupying forces and such liberal Germans as could be found and commonly accepted by the [occupiers] -- with a task far beyond its power, and simultaneously with an embittered, irresponsible opposition of unparalleled strength and prestige. The only result would be the final discrediting in Germany of all that the Western powers stand for, the assumption of the cloak of martyrdom by the nationalist elements, and the eventual triumphant return of the latter in the role of the liberators of Germany from a bungling, pseudodemocratic puppet regime. We must never forget that the forces of liberalism in Germany are pitifully weak. To place upon them the strain of major responsibility before their shoulders are broad enough to bear it may easily lead to their final destruction.
Finally, I should like to plead that the elimination of nationalist elements by action on our part is not only impracticable and inefficacious, but also unnecessary. The main purpose of our post-hostilities action on Germany is, as I take it, to assure that that country will not again become the seat of a program of military aggression which might threaten our security. For this, we all agree, it must be demonstrated to Germany that aggression does not pay. But I do not see that this involves the artificial removal of any given class in Germany from its position in public life. Let us rather assume – for there is ample justification for doing so – that nationalist Germany is Germany; and let us then set about to not to relieve that nationalist Germany of the very responsibilities it might justly be required to bear, but to hold it strictly to its tasks and to teach it the lessons we wish it to learn. The best treatment of the present ruling class in Germany is not an obliging removal from office at the very moment when the exercise has become an ugly burden, but a firm demonstration that Germany is not strong enough to threaten the interests of other great powers with impunity and that any unsuccessful attempt in this direction will inevitably lead to catastrophe. It is precisely the strong nationalistic ruling caste which must become convinced of this. Once they realize it, the realization will soon take the guts out of their own nationalism. It will probably eventually lead to their own political demise, for they have no program, in reality, but the greatness and power of Germany. But if they then go, it will be through the logic of history and through organic development of German political life, not through the premature, and unavoidably inept, interference of foreign powers. The political development of great peoples is conditioned and determined by their national experiences, but never by the manipulations of foreign powers in their internal affairs.
I recently finished George F. Kennan's memoirs. As many know, in his capacity as a career member of the Foreign Service, Kennan authored two of the most famous documents in modern-day diplomacy: the Long Telegram and the X-Article. He also participated peripherally in the development of the Truman Doctrine (with which he disagreed) and substantively in the development of the Marshall Plan (he chaired the Policy Planning Staff which developed the initiative).
A prolific writer and perspicacious observer, Kennan rarely failed to share his thinking with his superiors. In reading his thoughts on the post-hostilities treatment of Germany after the Second World War, I was struck by how they resonated sixty years later.
Kennan was concerned about the Allies' policy:
that, assuming it to be our duty to insure that Germans employed in administrative capacities are not enemies of democratic reconstruction, we should endeavor to eliminate from the administrative machinery of the German state all persons belonging to certain broad categories which comprise at least three million individuals.
Kennan's objections to this view are below (the emphasis is my own). Generally, Kennan feared that the political and cultural destruction of Germany by an occupying foreign power would incite a violent nationalist insurgency. He suggested, in the alternative, an approach by which the ruling elite was forced to recognize the futility of their aggression. Having already been defeated militarily, the "logic of history" and "organic development of German political life" would lead to their ultimate demise in the face of democratic ideals as determined and adopted by Germans' own "national experiences"; not as imposed by a foreign occupier.
Please feel free to substitute “Iraq” for “Germany” at every opportunity.
___________________________________________________________
Memoirs: 1925-1950
by George F. Kennan
[First] there is no thornier or more thankless task in the field of foreign affairs than that of trying to probe into the political records and motives of masses of individuals in a foreign country. It is impossible to avoid injustices, errors, and resentment. It involves the maintenance of a huge, and necessarily unpopular, investigative apparatus. I should place the proposed program for Germany clearly beyond the capacity of our own intelligence agencies. ...
If we attempt to carry out the program indicated, we will not succeed. People will either escape notice entirely; or they will prove their indispensability on technical grounds; or they will disappear and pop up elsewhere under other names; or they will see that records are destroyed ... We will eventually get caught up in a round of denunciation, confusion, and disunity from which none but the Germans would stand to profit.
Second, the project, even if it could be successfully carried out, would not serve the purpose for which it is designed. We would not find any other class of people competent to assume the burdens of those we had eliminated. Whether we like it or not, nine-tenths of what is strong, able, and respected in Germany has been poured into those very categories we have in mind. To remove these categories would mean to saddle some alternative regime – presumably composed of our occupying forces and such liberal Germans as could be found and commonly accepted by the [occupiers] -- with a task far beyond its power, and simultaneously with an embittered, irresponsible opposition of unparalleled strength and prestige. The only result would be the final discrediting in Germany of all that the Western powers stand for, the assumption of the cloak of martyrdom by the nationalist elements, and the eventual triumphant return of the latter in the role of the liberators of Germany from a bungling, pseudodemocratic puppet regime. We must never forget that the forces of liberalism in Germany are pitifully weak. To place upon them the strain of major responsibility before their shoulders are broad enough to bear it may easily lead to their final destruction.
Finally, I should like to plead that the elimination of nationalist elements by action on our part is not only impracticable and inefficacious, but also unnecessary. The main purpose of our post-hostilities action on Germany is, as I take it, to assure that that country will not again become the seat of a program of military aggression which might threaten our security. For this, we all agree, it must be demonstrated to Germany that aggression does not pay. But I do not see that this involves the artificial removal of any given class in Germany from its position in public life. Let us rather assume – for there is ample justification for doing so – that nationalist Germany is Germany; and let us then set about to not to relieve that nationalist Germany of the very responsibilities it might justly be required to bear, but to hold it strictly to its tasks and to teach it the lessons we wish it to learn. The best treatment of the present ruling class in Germany is not an obliging removal from office at the very moment when the exercise has become an ugly burden, but a firm demonstration that Germany is not strong enough to threaten the interests of other great powers with impunity and that any unsuccessful attempt in this direction will inevitably lead to catastrophe. It is precisely the strong nationalistic ruling caste which must become convinced of this. Once they realize it, the realization will soon take the guts out of their own nationalism. It will probably eventually lead to their own political demise, for they have no program, in reality, but the greatness and power of Germany. But if they then go, it will be through the logic of history and through organic development of German political life, not through the premature, and unavoidably inept, interference of foreign powers. The political development of great peoples is conditioned and determined by their national experiences, but never by the manipulations of foreign powers in their internal affairs.
posted by Happy Friday | 6:37 AM
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